Tenants, Landlords and the Housing Benefit: Who Gets It and What It Buys
Housing allowances are a central instrument with which governments address housing affordability for low-income renters. This paper studies the introduction of a direct housing benefit in Spain in 2022 using tax records that link each tenant to their landlord. Because the program reached a small share of eligible tenants, it could not move market rents, so any price response must arise within the bilateral relationship between landlord and tenant. We estimate a difference-in-differences design comparing recipients with eligible tenants who did not receive the benefit, exploiting the rationing of a fixed budget on a first-come, first-served basis. We find that landlords do not raise the rents of recipients, not even those with higher capacity to reprice their tenants. With prices fixed, the benefit increases disposable income. Recipients do not consume more housing, although the benefits induces more moves among older tenants. The benefit is associated with household formation, particularly for the young. Liquid saving do no increase, and labour income falls among the youngest recipients. A housing benefit paid to renters in a small-scale program reaches them and works as an income transfer.
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