A Model of Decentralized Platform Growth Under Tradable Governance
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) must allocate governance rights, ideally to a wide participation while maintaining a consistent collective decision-making. This challenge is compounded by the tradability of the initially dispersed governance rights. This paper develops a formal economic model of DAO governance distribution in which agents’ behavior is shaped by decentralized governance outcomes and anticipated proceeds from secondary markets.The model features heterogeneous agents and an optimal airdrop mechanism through which a platform manager decentralizes governance power. By scaling the airdrop, the adoption and voting participation will be affected, as well as the governance outcomes under the backdrop of network effects. The analysis identifies a tradeoff between adoption and governance misalignment and predicts a recentralization of governance power once tokens become tradable, yielding testable implications for DAO design.
Tuesday, November 24, 2026, from 12:00 to 1:00 p.m.
Room A406